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Teachers’ Monitoring and Schools’ Performance: 
Evidence from Public Schools in Pakistan 
Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of an innovative monitoring system on teacher attendance and 
school performance in Pakistan. In 2014, the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 
introduced the Independent Monitoring Project aiming at increasing teacher attendance in 
primary and secondary public schools by distributing to the government-hired monitors smart 
phones with a special data collection software installed. Our analysis is based on a difference-
in-differences approach using the country wide Annual Status of Education Report from 2012 
to 2016. Our findings suggest that monitoring of government schools has increased teacher 
attendance by 7.5 percentage points in the first year of intervention. But the positive effect 
wears off to 2.7 percentage points in the second year. Child attendance and test scores also 
increased in the first year, but in the second year they disappeared. Especially, in the first year, 
the monitoring system improved students’ math, reading, and English test scores by 0.13, 0.14, 
and 0.15 standard deviation, respectively, if they are grades 1-5. This result suggests that 
teacher attendance has an important role in delivering better student outcomes, but that 
monitoring should be coupled with appropriate incentive mechanism in order to have a lasting 
impact.
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21. INTRODUCTION
The recently developed “Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” emphasizes the need for 
more rigorous efforts through empirical findings that suggest feasible courses of actions to 
improve teaching quality and children learning achievement (UN SDGs, 2016). Despite some 
success in children enrollment, the overall quality of education especially at primary and 
secondary levels has remained the lowest in South Asia (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh etc.). 
Recently, a countrywide survey on educational attainment in India finds 44 percent of the 
children aged 7–12 cannot read a basic paragraph, and 50 percent cannot do simple subtraction
despite increased school enrollment(Banerjee et al., 2007). According to Annual Status of 
Education Report (ASER-Pakistan) which reveals important trends each year covering over 
255,000 children from 144 districts, Pakistan continues to be in a state of education emergency 
and learning lies at the heart of it. This is evident from its recent report showing that 52% 
children in grade 5 could read at story level dipping from 55% in 2015. Similarly, for English 
it was 46% (49% in 2015) and for arithmetic it was 48% compared to 50% in 2015 (ASER, 
2016). In similar circumstances, as Banerjee (2007) suggests, policies that only increase school 
enrollment may not guarantee learning outcomes. Recent evidence also supports the idea that 
interventions that only focus on school participation might not improve test scores for the 
average student (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. , 2018; Attaullah & Malik, 2015; Burde & Linden, 2013; 
Duflo et al., 2007; Munene, 2015).
One important component of school environment is the presence of teachers that influence the 
overall performance of children (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). Teachers’ 
absence has been a widespread problem in developing countries particularly in far-flung rural 
areas. Recent studies in education research document evidence that increased absence rate of 
teachers is strongly related with school and children performance(Banerjee & Duflo, 2006; 
Banerji et al., 2013; Kremer et al., 2006; Duflo & Hanna, 2005). A number of factors can be
found responsible for increased absenteeism such as distance from school, lack of appropriate 
incentives(Scott & Wimbush, 1991), ineffective monitoring(Duflo & Hanna, 2005) and other 
socio-economic factors(Alcázar et al., 2006). One of the important sources of differential 
teachers and schools performance is the type of monitoring and administrative oversight of 
schools and the resulting reward and penalty system. For example resources may be spent on 
hiring and payment to teachers who are absent from their schools such as the presence of ghost
schools(Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). According to ASER (2015), teachers' presence was one of 
the big factors to account for differences across learning outcomes across public and private 
schools in Pakistan. Also, there has been increasing focus by practitioners and development 
researchers on the teaching quality and punctuality that has significant direct and indirect 
effects on children performance(Duflo, 2007; Munene, 2015). Literature on teacher’s 
performance indicates that teacher incentives and other interventions have larger impact in low 
performance settings (Murname and Ganimian, 2014). However, considering the high 
absenteeism in developing countries, incentives alone may not work unless coupled with 
effective supervision of teaching staff particularly in rural areas. For example, in Pakistan’s 
Punjab province, a public-private partnership program that offered bonus for teachers, had 
limited effect on children’s test score because such incentives were not effectively linked with 
students performance (Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2010). Similarly, incentivizing the 
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may not improve teachers attendance and children learning (Kremer and Chen, 2001; CDPR, 
2014). With regard to effectiveness of monitoring methods, previous studies suggest different  
ways of supervision such as strengthening administrative oversight and community-based 
supervision to ensure better teachers’ attendance(CDPR, 2014; Muralidharan et al, 2014). 
Teachers failure to attend schools is mainly due to the lack of capacity of administration(e.g 
principle) and the beneficiary(children or local community) to monitor and penalize 
absence(Duflo & Hanna, 2005). Although, the headmasters have power to penalize absence by 
rules, nevertheless, by virtue of their close relationships with teachers (who generally belong 
to the local community), they are unable to enforce penalty or report absence to the higher 
authorities. Resultantly, the higher authorities in governments who are responsible for decision 
making, lack the real reporting of data from far-flung rural areas or get manipulated record 
about schools and teachers presence. 
A number of reforms initiatives have been proposed for developing countries that can 
maximize the quality of learning of enrolled children, reduce dropout ratio and attract out-of-
school children(Robert, 2005). The main focus of these studies remains both on the demand 
and supply side of education such as provision of educational facilities, widening access to 
education and increasing enrollment in schools etc.(Banerjee & Duflo, 2009; Jones, & Rajani, 
2014; Raikes, 2016). With regard to teachers’ availability in schools in developing countries, 
few studies have attempted to investigate the effectiveness of different policies that are targeted 
at schools or teachers’ supervision. These include teachers’ incentive programs such as 
providing incentives based on exam score of children, direct monitoring of teachers 
performance through camera coupled with high-powered incentives and community-controlled 
interventions etc.(Alcázar et al., 2006; Duflo & Hanna, 2005; Scott & Wimbush, 1991). The 
World Development Report suggests the expansion of community-based monitoring of schools 
that might strengthen the flow of information between community and school administration 
and effectively involving community in hiring, firing and payment or transfer of teachers 
(WDR, 2018). However, contextual evidence on community-based monitoring reflect less 
effectiveness of such programs particularly in rural areas (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Kremer 
& Vermeersch, 2005). One important factor in this cases is the awareness of local community 
or average education level that might influence the community response to teachers’ 
unavailability. In other words, given the overall low education level in the community (more 
often in developing countries), it is less likely that local people will realize the  consequences 
of teachers’ absence and its effect on children learning. While much has been researched about 
significance of teacher’s availability and school facilities, less is known about how to increase 
teacher’s attendance especially in rural and remote areas in an effective and cost efficient way. 
This paper takes advantage of data collected by the Annual Status of Education Report
(ASER)-which is similar to Pratham in India and Uwezo in Africa-, to attempt a natural 
experiment on a recently introduced government-schools monitoring project by the KP 
government in Pakistan. We attempt to find a comparable administrative unit that has not been 
affected by the policy yet shares similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics 
across the border with the treated administrative unit. 
4The results discussed in this research suggests a number of practical and methodological 
insights. First, school performance in terms of teacher’s attendance and school facilities can be 
increased by increasing monitoring of schools using professionally trained monitors and 
adaptation of latest technology. Second, evidence support the idea that improving schools 
performance affect parents and children behavior in terms of sending children to schools and 
attending schools respectively. Earlier studies based on natural experiments and randomized 
evaluations find mixed results on the effectiveness of monitoring vis-à-vis indirect incentives 
and rewards system in government policies on children’s learning outcomes in developing 
countries. Third, given the weak public education system in developing countries, monitoring
of schools and teachers should be coupled with appropriate incentive/punishment mechanism
in order to have a lasting impact on children performance. Finally, we argue that there is scope 
for the use of nationally representative surveys in conducting natural experiments for assessing 
the impact of education programs carried out by sub-national governments in developing 
countries. 
The following section gives a brief account of the education system in Pakistan, its short history
and major problems that hinder the road to achieving quality education. The 3rd section 
provides a detailed description of the monitoring program and its implementation procedures. 
Section 4 outlines theoretical framework in the light of previous works. Experimental design 
and its key conditions are discussed in section 5. Section 6 describes the data, Section 7 details 
the empirical strategy followed by results and discussion in section 8. The last section 
concludes. 
2. GAPS IN PAKISTAN’S EDUCATION SYSTEM  
Being the sixth largest country in the World, Pakistan inhabits population of around 210 million 
of which 64% is below the age of 30 (UNDP, 2018). Despite significant decline in the fertility 
level in recent years, Pakistan's population is still growing at a rate of 2% per year, highest in 
South Asia (WB, 2018). According to Burki (2005), those less than 18 years old will account 
for about 50% of total population in 2030. This represents a big challenge as a significant 
proportion of young people will be poorly educated and inadequately skilled in case the 
successive governments fail to launch and implement ambitious education reforms. 
To understand the structure of education system in Pakistan, it is important to dig into its history 
that started in the late 1940s. For the first 25 years (1947 to 1970), Pakistan's education system 
was relatively efficient, not much different from its neighboring India. Dominated by public 
sector, education departments in provinces were responsible for administering primary and 
secondary schools and colleges with a public sector teachers training schools and colleges. For 
several decade, the number of private schools was not much within the system of education.  
However, after the denationalization in 1990s, the private schooling become another major 
source of education at the lower level particularly for the elite class of society. Currently, the 
large public education system starts with primary schools at the lower level (0 to 5 grades), 
then secondary and high schools, and autonomous public funded universities at the higher level.  
Over the years, the amount of budget spent on public education has been one the lowest 
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estimates, Pakistan spends nearly 4.9% of its GDP on education with about 30% spending on 
primary education (WB, 2016).  According to Pakistan’s Economic Survey, the overall literacy 
rate is 58% with male 70% and female 48% (MOF, 2017). In other words, nearly one-half of 
the women cannot read or write while this gap is much higher in rural areas. Solutions proposed 
for reforming the public education include incentives for parents and children, increasing the 
proportion of public resources going into education sector, diversion of more funds towards 
primary schooling and investment in teachers’ training and improving the quality of schools 
and curriculum(Robert, 2005).
Pakistan continues to suffer from slower growth in key socio-economic indicators reflected by 
the human development report as compared to its neighboring countries such as India and 
Bangladesh (UNDP, 2016). Low education quality, both at primary and secondary level is at 
the centre of many problems that the country face in almost all regions. According to a study 
by International growth Centre (ICG), in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KP) province (the focus of this 
paper) in 2012-13, only 63% of 4-9 years old children were enrolled in schools with a much 
lower (56%) female enrollment(CDPR, 2014). For higher grade, the net enrollment is even 
worst. For example, for middle schools, the net enrollment was hardly 40% reflecting a 
significant dropout or no-enrollment during the middle school age group (11 to 15 years).  
Similarly, teacher’s absenteeism rate was 16% for primary, 21% for middle, and 17% for high 
schools indicating unavailability of teaching service at a critical school age. With regard to 
learning achievements, the entire country including KP province faces alarmingly low level. 
Out of surveyed enrolled children, only 40% of grade-5 children could answer the second-
grade level mathematics and language questions. From the supply side of education, the KP 
province employs nearly 55% of the civil servants in education department with a significant 
number of teachers. For example, teachers make up at around 75% of the 180,000 employees 
overall in elementary and secondary education department. To what extent this chunk of 
employment has been effective is the policy question that motivates this study. 
Recently, as part of the constitutional amendments, Pakistan has devolved most of 
administrative and fiscal decision making to the provinces. In this devolved setting, provinces 
are autonomous in reforming their education sectors to improve the dismal conditions of 
schools and teachers quality and children learning. The establishment of an Independent 
Monitoring Unit (IMU) is one such initiative taken by the provincial government of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province that aims at monitoring teachers and schools performance through 
trained monitors equipped with smart-phone aided facility(section 3 provide more details on 
IMU). According to ICG's analysis on the IMU school level data in 2014, there was significant 
variation in teacher’s attendance and student attendance rates at the primary and secondary 
level. Also, large variation in school size measured as enrollment of children and teachers-
students ratio were identified. Exploiting this variation, the same study by applying a statistical 
model, finds significantly positive effect of teachers attendance and school infrastructure on 
the children enrollment rates. With the exception of seven districts-in hard areas1- where 
                                                            
1 Currently, seven districts e.g., Kohistan, Battagram, Tor Ghar, Dir Lower, Dir Upper, Shangla and Tank have 
been identified as “hard areas” for girls’ schools(CDPR, 2014)
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teachers similar to other provinces of Pakistan. Moreover, to improve girl’s education, the KP 
government gives additional allowances for female education supervisors to increase their 
inspections to schools. Similarly, to attract girls enrollment, the KP government offers stipend 
program for secondary students for selected districts2 with low enrollment. Also, in two 
districts, special scholarships are offered for girls for their enrollment in schools (e.g Kohistan 
and Torghar). A detailed review of the KP government civil service rules carried out by ICG's 
research shows the presence of a number of direct and indirect incentives for improvement in 
teacher’s attendance and students learning(CDPR, 2014). However, these incentives were not 
properly linked with government objectives of improving education outcomes. The review 
further finds that promotion and up-gradation procedures, performance evaluation and transfer 
policies were not realistically linked with teacher’s attendance measurements or student 
performance in exams, suggesting the need for a more objective criteria for measuring teacher’s 
performance. 
3. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
In struggle for quality improvement in education sector, in 2014, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) 
provincial government took an important initiative of establishing a landmark project, 
Independent Monitoring Unit (IMU) for monitoring teachers and schools performance through 
trained monitors equipped with smart-phone aided facility. The project was aimed at 
monitoring and data collection for over 28000 public sector primary and secondary schools in 
the province. The basic objective of the IMU was to ensure presence of teachers through 
effective monitoring besides collection and compilation of data on basic schools facilities such 
as electricity, boundary wall, toilets, and furniture etc. The specific objectives of the project 
included, collection of data on the presence of teachers in school, number of children enrolled, 
schools facilities, availability of school administration and other school related information. 
Lunched formally in April 2014, the IMU’s mandate was to monitor over 28000 schools with 
over   121,618 government appointed teachers across the province. The implementation of IMU 
project needed quite laborious work as the KP province is geographically characterized with 
rugged terrain and dispersed population in rural areas. Also, over the last 18 years, the 
education sectors in KP province and it’s neighboring federally administered tribal areas, have 
been a direct target of terrorism resulting into destruction of hundreds of schools particularly 
girls school and killing of several teachers including female teachers. The IMU program 
conducts monitoring using both human efforts and technology for keeping external control 
while dealing with shirking teachers and school administration. 
The IMU hired 550 Data Collection and Monitoring Assistants (DCMAs or monitors) and 
subsequently appointed them in every district of KP province. Their job is to visit randomly to 
government schools located within the assigned administrative clusters3 (at least one time per 
month to each school). The assignment of clusters rotate clock-wise on monthly basis to 
                                                            
2 These low enrollment districts of KP include Hangu, Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki, D.I Khan, Shangla and Nowshera
3 Generally, a district is divided into 10 to 30 clusters(depending on the population of schools and gender) 
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A in January, will inspect cluster-B in February and so on.  Each DCMAs are required to visit 
at least 3 to 4 schools every day in schooling-hour to collect data. They are not allowed to share 
any prior information with schools or teachers about their scheduled visits. Upon inspection of 
the school, DCMAs are required to send attendance status of teachers (confirmed with their 
thumb-impression) to the central office through GPRS system installed in their smart-phone. 
The performance of DCMAs is in turn supervised by the District Monitoring Officers (DMOs) 
appointed one for each district across the province (H. Altaf4, interview, October 2018). The 
IMU operation is based on IT application by trained monitors following a structured protocol 
provided by the provincial independent monitoring authority. The DCMAs collect data by 
physically verifying various school-based indicators after visiting the school in his/her 
designated area. The DCMAs then upload the information directly to the database of IMU 
using a prescribed questionnaire designed by the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Department (E& SED) of the KP province. The DCMAs use a special android application for 
conducting various checks and filter techniques to ensure provision of accurate data. The data 
sent by DCMAs to the database is further analyzed by IMU’s IT team using various statistical 
tools to help make incentive (reward and punishment) decisions and take other necessary 
actions. So far, according to IMU officials, prizes worth 220 million Rupees have been 
distributed under the Teachers Incentive Program (TIP) among teachers that have higher 
attendance record. The IMU data was utilized in deciding on TIP criteria. However, with regard 
to penalty of low performing teachers, there is no such record of punishment or any decision 
whatsoever.  
                                                            
4 A personal Interview was conducted online with Mr. Ataf Hussain, IMU official at District Shangla of KP 
Province to obtain information about the organizational structure and job description of IMU monitors and their 
appointment methodology.  
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So far, the government reports suggests that teachers attendance and punctuality have improved 
significantly ever-since the launch of the IMU, however, there is no empirical evidence about 
the impact of the extent to which the IMU has increased teachers attendance and the students’ 
academic performance. This proposed research therefore will be a significant contribution 
towards genuine evaluation of this project.
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This study aims at estimating the effect of the IMU program introduced by the KP provincial 
government in Pakistan on the school quality measured in the form of teacher’s attendance on 
one hand, and on children learning outcomes measured through ability tests in three subjects 
e.g reading, math and English, on the other hand. To do so, it is important to use a model that 
truly identifies the causal effect of the IMU program. Literature on impact evaluation
methodologies suggests several tools to estimate the impact of a policy intervention in 
education sector on student’s achievement and school quality(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2018; 
Alcott & Rose, 2015; Attaullah & Malik, 2015; Burde & Linden, 2013; Card & Krueger, 2000; 
Croke, 2014; Duflo, 2007; Duflo et al., 2007; Munene, 2015). The focus of these studies is to 
know the likely impacts of various policy interventions on students’ academic achievements. 
9Recently, randomized control trials (RCTs) have been considered the most effective design to 
find causal effect particularly in poor developing countries. For example incentive program 
linked with teachers presence measured through camera photograph with children in randomly 
selected schools in India by Duflo & Hanna (2005) finds reduced teachers attendance 
significantly and improved test score. Similarly, in a randomized trial in Nicaragua, radio 
instructions had significant impacts on pupils’ math score (Jamison et al., 1981). In Kenya, 
randomized experiment of provision of school meals were was found to have positive impact 
on test score as long as teachers were well trained (Vermeersch & Kremer; 2004). In a remedial 
education program in urban India that focused on improving learning environment in 
government schools, increased test scores was observed at a reasonably low cost (Banerjee et 
al., 2004). Also in India, a computer-assisted learning program suggest potential positive 
impacts on students’ learning achievement (Banerjee et al., 2004). However, besides other 
challenges such as implementation etc., one of the big limitations associated with such 
experiments is their high cost of implementation. 
The second most credible design in recent impact evaluation literature is natural experiment. 
In the absence of random assignment of subjects, one can exploit variation caused by any policy 
change that is exogenous in nature.  In such cases, the simplest way of calculating the causal 
effect is using “difference-in-difference” (DiD) method, by comparing pre-program difference 
with the post-program difference between treated and untreated groups. Evidence from recent 
natural experiments in low and middle income countries suggests a positive impact of 
increasing school quality on students’ academic performance, despite extensive variation in 
different contexts. These experiments include(but are not limited to) impact evaluation of 
primary school environments on secondary school outcomes using data on Ethiopian Jews by 
Gould, Lavy & Paserman (2004) and impact of class size on student academic performance in 
Israel using Maimonides’ Rule by Angrist & Lavy(1999) etc. Results of natural experiments 
vary by context and by subjects owing to a number of reasons. For example, a natural 
experiment using Israeli data shows reducing class size raises reading score but not math score, 
while providing computers has no effect on academic performance (Angrist & Lavy 2002). 
One big challenge of such experimental designs is the availability of control (untreated) group 
that satisfies all conditions for an ideal comparison. For example, in the context, of school’ 
monitoring program, one needs to have schools that are not directly or indirectly affected by 
the policy targeted for specific treated schools.  Another challenge is to find schools that share 
similar characteristics with the treated schools before the intervention. In cases where the 
outcome variables between the treated and untreated subjects vary before the interventions, 
studies attempt to mitigate this challenge by adopting the common trend assumption 
conditional with availability of data. Recently, the two stage least square (2SLS) or 
instrumental variables (IV) is adopted as an alternative approach to estimating the impact of 
education policy interventions. According to this approach, a variable is used as an instrument 
which may or may not arise from natural experiment, but is correlated with the endogenous 
variable and uncorrelated with the unobserved factors that might affect the outcome variable 
(e.g child’s learning). In IV estimation, the common variation between the instrument and the 
endogenous variable is exploited in determining the estimate of the effect of certain variable of 
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interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2013). Despite its convincing power in 
explaining education production function, finding a good instrument is often a challenge.  
While natural experiments (and randomized trails) are meant to create a pool of such results 
that are less likely to suffer from estimation problems, development economists stress the need 
for a much larger set of results on a more representative sample of population before reaching 
a general conclusion. Nevertheless, in many developing countries, natural experiments and 
randomized control tails are considered the most effective means for improving school quality 
through addressing the problems associated with weak teachers or teachers’ behavior(Glewwe 
& Kremer, 2006). Understanding the impact of policies that affect teachers’ behaviors is critical 
particularly in the context of developing countries that suffer from higher absenteeism. 
Considering the exogenous nature of IMU program introduction in KP province, Pakistan, we 
attempt to exploit an annually representative survey data produced by the Annual Status of 
Education Report (ASER) to conduct a natural experiment. Note that the purpose of collection 
of ASER data is unrelated with the IMU program in all aspects whatsoever. We attempt to find 
a comparable administrative unit that has not been affected by the policy yet shares similar 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics across the border with the treated 
administrative unit. We test this by conducting a pre-program trend analysis on all variables 
used in our estimations. We also supplement our results by adopting variation in our 
endogenous variable (teachers’ attendance caused by increased monitoring) as an instrument
to estimate the effect on children test performance. In doing so, one face the difficulty of factors 
that affect teachers’ quality such as punctuality, might also affect child’ test performance at 
home. However, we take advantage of the clear exogenous nature of the monitoring project. In 
other words, controlling for the effect of monitoring on teachers attendance, the IMU is less 
likely to affect children learning achievements through any other channel. 
5. DATA
Out main data source is the 5 years country wide Annual Status of Education Reports (ASER),
Pakistan survey, from 2012 to 2016. The ASER5 is frequently cited in reference to teachers 
attendance, children enrollment and attendance, learning ability, private school enrollment, and 
other key education indicators by renowned researchers (Jones et al., 2014; Banerji et al., 2013; 
Zaka & Maheen, 2010; French, Kingdon, & others, 2010). ASER is the large scale citizen-led, 
household based initiative managed by Idara-e-Taleem-Aagahi (ITA)-Pakistan in partnership 
with a number of governmental and non-governmental organizations, to provide reliable data 
on the status of primary and secondary education in all rural and few urban districts of Pakistan.
Each year, ASER conducts a comprehensive assessment of the state of learning, school 
performance, and other indicators of primary and secondary education throughout rural 
Pakistan. Mobilizing more than 10,000 volunteers each year, the survey covers 600 household 
in each of Pakistan’s 136 districts yielding a large national dataset of 81600 households and 
around 286,000 children per year. Table 1 provides year wise coverage of ASER data for KP 
province and FATA (the target of our study). The ASER household survey include learning 
                                                            
5 ASER survey is similar to Pratham in India and the Uwezo surveys in Africa.
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tests performed by children at home while a separate survey of the government and private 
schools is conducted in the sample villages. 
The ASER sampling framework is systematic and well designed. For example, each district is 
provided with a village list with population information given by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS). In view of the variability of the key variables, population distribution and 
field resources, ASER selects a sample of 600 households from each district. Each district is 
further divided into 30 villages whereas 20 household are selected from each village. The 
ASER adopts tow stage sampling design. In the first stage 30 villages are selected using 
probability proportional to size (PPS) method. In the second stage, 20 household are selected6
from each of the 30 selected villages. Village is considered as the primary sampling unit, while 
household is treated as secondary sampling unit. Every year, the ASER retains 20 villages from 
previous year, 10 new villages are added and 10 villages are dropped from the previous year. 
In this way the ASER survey give us a “rotating panel” of villages for better estimates. With 
regard to schools selection, ASER choose at least one government school which is mandatory 
(could be more than one) and one private school form each selected village. The later ASER 
surveys also include urban regions in Pakistan (ASER, 2016, 2015, 2013).  
Table 1: ASER Survey Coverage (2012 to 2016) for KP and FATA 
Survey Coverage 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA KP FATA 
No. of Districts 23 9 25 9 27 9 26 11 24 9
No. of Villages 688 270 763 265 789 270 769 330 704 270
No. of Households 13,702 5,375 15,144 5,271 15,663 5,369 15,032 6,544 13,807 5,390
No. of Children 41,003 18,529 46,877 18,722 49,473 18,743 46,045 22,890 41,804 17,753
Notes: The number of districts covered each year in KP and FATA are not equal because of two reasons. First, 
coverage in districts which were affected by military operation against terrorist such as Mohmand Agency was 
skipped in 2012. Secondly, districts where the ASER team couldn’t reach due to other administrative difficulties 
such as district Kohistan were also skipped. However, the number of missing district each year ranges between 1 
and 4.  
The primary strength of ASER dataset is its enormous sample size of children aged 5 to 16 
years, households, government schools and private school related information across all 
districts in rural Pakistan that provides a clear picture of the state of schooling across the
country. Secondly, the ASER learning tests which are well organized and carefully designed 
and conducted at home provide an opportunity to analyze children’s ability without any 
potential school bias. Testing at school often carries a potential bias when teachers push more 
competent students forward during the survey. This feature of ASER testing allows us to be 
more confident about the validity and findings on learning tests. Moreover, ASER household 
survey collects data on all potential child-related and household related socio-economic 
variables that might affect learning ability such as age, gender, enrollment status, school 
                                                            
6 ASER divides each selected village into four parts: Surveyors are required to start from the central location and 
pick every 5th household in a circular fashion till 5 households are selected from each part (ASER, 2016).
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status(government or private), current grade, tuition facility, house-condition and ownership
and parents’ education etc. Table 2 (a) and (b) shows the summary statistics of the 5 years 
ASER surveys annual data pooled form 2012 to 2016. The third important feature of ASER 
survey is its systematic coding of districts, villages, households, and children identification 
(IDs) that allows us to apply fixed effect models to control for any group-specific unobserved 
characteristics. Finally, the ASER provides sufficient baseline datasets on government and 
private schools information that enables us to conduct pre-treatment and falsification test on 
all relevant factors affecting school based and children related outcome.
Table-2(a) Government school summary (2012-16) pooled 
Government Schools Private Schools
Variables KP FATA KP FATA 
Primary School(1 to 5) 0.655 0.789 0.272 0.208
Middle School Type A(1 to 8) 0.048 0.093 0.286 0.283
Middle School Type B(6 to 8) 0.095 0.003 - -
High School Type A(1 to 10) 0.089 0.107 0.397 0.487
High School Type B(6-to-10) 0.157 0.005 - -
All other school types 0.006 0.004 0.042 0.021
Average Enrollment of Children 230.755 155.404 293.698 386.779
Average Children Attendance 153.279 131.903 261.715 342.863
Average No. of Teachers Appointed 7.724 5.019 12.885 11.696
Average No. of Teachers Present 6.687 4.477 11.145 10.788
Student teacher ratio 38.468 39.145 25.434 33.56
Teachers-Attendance Ratio 0.875 0.897 0.919 0.906
Children Attendance Ratio 0.844 0.826 0.867 0.889
Laboratory Available(yes=1) 0.208 0.086 0.405 0.346
Compute Lab Available(Yes=1) 0.065 0.035 0.263 0.096
Internet Availability 0.03 0.007 0.19 0.05
N  (No. of Schools surveyed) 3618 1386 1718 240
Notes: Table 2(a) use data from ASER government and private school surveys (pooled from 2012 to 2016).  Values 
on school types and facilities represent the mean percentage of the surveyed schools. Student-teachers ratio, 
teacher’s attendance ratio and children attendance ratio represents average ratio on corresponding variables. E.g. 
Teachers Attendance Ratio is calculated as no. of teachers present/total appointed teachers. Similarly, Children-
Attendance Ratio is calculated as no. of children present/total enrollment in the surveyed school. KP stands for 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province representing the treatment group while and FATA represents the control group 
called Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Middle schools type B and Higher schools type B do not apply for 
private schools. 
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Table-2 (b) Children Related Summary-2012-16(Pooled) 
Variables KP FATA
Demographic Characteristics
Child Age 9.038 8.438
Gender(Female=1) 0.397 0.37
Child Enrollment Status
Child Enrollment Status(Yes=1) 0.755 0.675
Child Dropped Out(Yes=1) 0.034 0.033
Child School Type 
Child Enrolled in Government School(Yes=1) 0.518 0.481
Child Enrolled in Private School(Yes=1) 0.218 0.168
Child Enrolled in Other Schools(Yes=1) 0.014 0.024
Household Socio-Economic Conditions 
Private Tutoring(Yes=1) 0.072 0.05
House Ownership(Yes=1) 0.896 0.917
House Construction Weak(Yes=1) 0.348 0.544
House Construction Semi-Strong(Yes=1) 0.329 0.297
House Construction Strong(Yes=1) 0.323 0.158
Electricity Connection Available(Yes=1) 0.892 0.882
Mobile service Available(Yes=1) 0.841 0.687
TV Available(Yes=1) 0.512 0.406
Parents Information 
Father Age 41.004 39.38
Father Ever Attended the School 0.585 0.51
Father Years of Education 5.847 4.57
Mother Age 35.635 35.252
Mother Ever  Attended the School 0.274 0.117
Mother Years of Education 2.202 0.77
N    (No. of Children surveyed aged 3-16 years) 225202 96637
Notes: Table 2(b) use data from ASER- household survey (pooled from 2012-to-2016). All 
values represent the average percentages of the surveyed children.  KP stands for Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Province representing the treatment group while and FATA represents the 
control group called Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
6. EMPIRICAL  STRATEGY 
The unique setting of the study area, the launching of monitoring program and ASER survey 
give us an opportunity to conduct a form of natural experiment.  It is known that the monitoring 
project, IMU, was launched in the middle of April, 2014 across all districts of KP province. In 
Pakistan, two months summer vacations are observed every year from mid-June to mid-August. 
During the vacations, teachers are not required to attend the schools. The ASER collects data 
in September each year. In this way, considering the starting date of the program and summer 
vacations, it is less likely that the ASER data collected in September, 2014 has captured the 
program impact after September. During the first two months at the outset of the program (from 
mid-April to mid-June), a large scale program is less likely to be fully operationalized. The 
figure 2 shows the timeline and ASER data collection from 2012 to 2016. Therefore we do not 
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have reason to consider year 2014 as a post-program period and expect the effect to take place 
in 2015. Given this context, our treatment period will consist of two years (2015 till 2016) in 
the selected districts. By the same token, considering 2014 as pre-program period is also likely 
to be bias our estimate, given the launch of the program in April, 2014. Although, we present 
results of 2014 as pre-program in for checking any possible difference (see annexures), we rely 
on 2012 to 2013 as pre-program in our main results.  
6.1.The Model
Our main outcome variables in the first stage is whether the intervention program has increased 
the teacher’s attendance in the government schools in the KP province.
We hold the following assumptions to carry out diff-in-diff analysis in the given settings: 
· The primary, and secondary education system in FATA is same as the KP due to the 
Exam Systems conducted by designated Education Boards7. 
· There is no significant difference in teacher’s attendance and children performance 
between KP and FATA before the IMU introduction. 
· FATA and KP share similar characteristics in terms of social, economic, geographic,
and cultural conditions and population density etc.  
· Our treatment period consists of two years (2015 till 2016) in the KP while the Pre-
Treatment period consists of three years from 2012 to 2014. 
We estimate the effect of monitoring program on school outcomes using the following equation: 
     =    +                 +        +∝ +    +      ,      (1)
where      represents outcome on surveyed government school i in district d in time t; 
              is an interaction of treatment districts and post-year t (e.g.              =1 
if school i belongs to district d of KP province & t = 2015 or 2016 and              =0  
otherwise;         Vector of School level controls; ∝  is the district fixed effect;    is year 
fixed effect; and      is an error term clustered at village (=school) level.
                                                            
7 Education boards are constitutional bodies responsible for implementing school curriculum, conducting and 
supervising annual examinations and declaring results of government and private schools under the jurisdiction. 
All boards are located in KP province but consists of districts under its jurisdiction both in KP and FATA. In total, 
there are 8 Education Boards in KP province. 
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In a similar fashion the children test performance is estimated by the following equation: 
      =    +                +        + ∝ +    +    +       ,         (2)
where       represents normalized test score of surveyed child i in district d in grade g at time
t;                is an interaction of treatment district d and post-year t;
         Vector of individual child related controls; ∝  is the district fixed effect;    is year 
fixed effect;   is individual grades’ fixed effect; and       is an error term clustered at village 
level. 
6.2.  Pre-Program Trend in KP and FATA
We take the advantage of the pre-program data to test the common trend assumption - the 
outcome in treatment and control group would follow the same trend in the absence of the 
treatment. The results suggest that teacher’s attendance on average did not vary significantly 
between treatment and control before the policy was introduced. The same is true for children 
test performance. Table 3 (a) & (b) present the pre-program trends between KP and FATA on 
our main outcome variables, teacher’s attendance and children standardized test scores
respectively. The coefficient for interaction term(pre-program diff) shows that after controlling 
for observed factors such as school existing teaching quality, training quality, school age and 
size, the difference between KP and FATA in terms of teachers attendance ratio is not 
statistically significant in 2013 as well as in 2014. A similar common trend was observed
between KP and FATA on normalized test score of children as shown in table 3 (b). We observe
that, on average, coefficient of the interaction term of the normalized score for Reading, Math 
and English in lower grades (0 to 5) is not statistically significant indicating similar 
performance of KP children with FATA children in terms of these subjects. This is in line with 
previous studies that indicated lower performance of both KP province and FATA compared 
to the country-average in terms of basic reading ability at lower grades. With regard to 
education sector reforms, a close analysis of the recent government decisions in KP and FATA 
shows that during these five years period, there was no significant policy intervention other 
than education reforms that mainly focused on teachers attendance, school infrastructure and 
oversight(CDPR, 2014; Zaka & Maheen, 2010). In conducting pre-program analysis of 
children test performance, we control for all possible observed child-specific characteristics 
such as age, gender, parents education, household size and dummies for house ownership and 
facilities(see table 2(b) for description of control variables). We also conduct a pre-treatment 
analysis on upper grade children and including 2014 as pre-program (see Appendix III and IV 
for results). Overall, the trend is similar in all subjects except lower performance in normalized 
English score of children belonging to treatment province in upper grades.  
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Table 3 (a): Pre-Program Trend, Teachers Attendance Ratio[ Equation(7)]
Dep. Var:  Teachers Attendance Ratio Post=2013 Post=2014
Pre-Program Diff (Treatment*Post) 0.0264 -0.0201
(0.0230) (0.0173)
School Teaching Quality 0.0359 0.0327**
(0.0225) (0.0166)
School Training Quality 0.00330 0.0223
(0.0268) (0.0185)
Urban 0.160*** 0.0953*
(0.0587) (0.0554)
Old schools 0.00565 -0.00121
(0.0138) (0.0103)
School Size 0.0861 0.128***
(0.0579) (0.0423)
School Facilities YES YES
District FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Constant 0.706*** 0.745***
(0.0510) (0.0426)
Observations 1,933 2,967
R-squared 0.074 0.060
Notes: Table-1 reports Pre-Program difference between KP province (treatment) and FATA 
(control) on teacher’s attendance. Column (1) represent Post=2013 vs Pre=2012 while column (2) 
represent Post=2014 vs Pre=2012-13.  The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in 
school to the total appointed teachers. Variable Pre-Program Diff is a typical diff-in-diff interaction
of to-be-treated province (KP) and Post (year =2013 in column (1) and year=2014 in column (2)). 
Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for 
treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are 
continuous variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level 
to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities controls include availability of 
water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a 
continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school 
with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School 
Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation 
is the surveyed government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively.    
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7. RESULTS 
7.1. Program Impact on Government Schools Outcomes 
Table 4 (a) reports the main results of the monitoring program on the ratio of present teachers 
to total appointed teachers using basic OLS model in equation (7). We check the program effect 
using different post and pre-program-years to see any difference during post-program two years. 
Since most of the KP province and FATA contains rural areas, time-invariant district-specific 
factors such as school density (schools per km2) and district administration offices etc., might 
affect the outcome variable(see appendix-V for list of districts in KP and FATA). To overcome 
any time-invariant district-specific unobserved characteristics and time trend, we use district 
fixed effect and year fixed effect respectively throughout our regressions. Also considering the 
potential variation in teacher’s behaviors, we control for schools teaching and training quality, 
urban districts, history, size and a vector of school-related facilities. School teaching and 
training quality is measured as a ratio of teachers with master’s degree and professional training 
certificate to the total appointed teachers in the surveyed school. We represent schools’ history 
as a dummy of old schools with more than 50 years of establishment equals to one.  As 
suggested by previous studies, enrollment of children in schools might affect teachers 
attendance behavior (Koedel & Betts, 2007), we therefore control for school-size represented 
by enrollment. The role of school infrastructure in creating better teaching environment is well 
documented in education literature (Abhijit Banerjee & Duflo, 2006; Robert, 2005). We control 
for all school-related facilities surveyed by ASER (e.g. availability of water, boundary wall, 
toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet). 
Table 4(a) column (1) shows a significantly positive effect of the program on teachers’ 
attendance ratio in the year immediately following the program (e.g in 2015). Controlling for 
observable covariates such as existing school teaching and training quality, location, history, 
school size, and a vector of school facilities, the coefficient of the interaction term shows an 
increase of .067 percentage points in teachers’ attendance ratio in the KP province as compared 
to FATA. In other words, being exposed to the monitoring program, on average, teacher’s 
attendance in government schools is likely to increase by nearly 8 % in the first year of program 
implementation. This effect is larger given the mean value of the dependent variable (.881). 
Table 4(a) does not include 2014 data, considering it a transition period. (See Appendix VI) 
for results on 2014 as pre-treatment period).  Column (2) adds year 2016 as post-program 
period into our analysis. It can be observed that the program effect is not significant and has
been decreased by nearly half after two years of program implementation. The effect is 
however statistically significant at 5% when we include year 2014 in our analysis. Appendix 
Table 4(a) reports results after including year 2014 as post-program period.  
There could be several reason for decreasing effect of the program. First, the expected penalty 
(or reward) as a result of IMU was not strictly observed despite certain absenteeism reporting 
by IMU. Secondly, as other studies observe, there could be a learning effect(Banerjee & Duflo, 
2006), from the perspective of teachers such as, teachers might have  learnt sources of shirking 
by establishing contacts with people who might observe visiting monitors on their way to 
schools. This can happen more likely in far-flung rural areas, where distance between schools 
and monitors’ place of residence is large. In their paper on addressing absence in India using a 
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camera photograph, Banerjee & Duflo (2006) contend the external control of monitoring by 
someone within the institutional hierarchy such as headmaster or principle due to possible 
collusion with teachers. Although the case of KP monitoring program does not have this 
problem of external control (e.g. monitors do not belong to schools, rather they are externally 
appointed and their jobs are rotated), yet we cannot rule out the possibility of shirking by 
teachers in areas where teachers’ distance from school is small. 
Although, the effect decreased in the second year, the overall impact of IMU program appears 
to bring immediate improvement in the teacher’s attendance over a large area. We check the 
robustness of our model [equation (7)] on various sub-samples of school levels such as primary 
schools (0-to-5 grades) and high schools (6-to-10 grades) and a reduced sample of districts 
bordering with FATA. There are sixteen districts in KP province which share border with any 
districts (agency) in FATA. The results (shown in section 8.3) are similar and follow the same 
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pattern as observed in table 4(a). Also, we conduct a falsification test using the private schools 
data on post-program period by running the same regression as table 4(a). Result of falsification 
test (shown in Appendix I) reflect no systematic difference in the teacher’s attendance pattern 
in private schools suggesting evidence in favor of IMU effect on government schools. 
7.2. Learning Achievements 
Even if monitoring increased teacher’s presence in schools, it is not clear whether increased 
teachers presence affect learning achievements. In other words, whether teachers teach once 
they decide to be in the schools is the question of our interest in this section. Several factors 
can be considered in explaining the mechanisms through which any potential impact of 
increased oversight of teachers and schools might influence the learning capacity of children. 
The basic theory behind hypothesizing the direct effect of teachers monitoring on children 
performance is the marginal cost of teaching after a teacher is present in school. Especially at 
lower level such as primary schools where the subject contents usually are not much difficult 
and where few teachers are appointed per school. We assume that after being present in school, 
at lower level, teachers generally tend to teach (they don’t want to shirk), hence children get 
benefited of the increased presence(Duflo & Hanna, 2005). In other words, getting teachers to 
schools may work effectively at the lower level schools. At higher level however, the marginal 
cost of teachers after being present in school might be higher given the subject contents 
difficulty at of higher grades such as maths, english and science subjects of 9th or 10th grade. 
Previous studies support the idea that developing countries such Pakistan and India, are 
suffering from the low teachers’ capacity at higher level(Robert, 2005). Secondly, parents 
might positively respond to a large scale oversight program in rural areas in terms of sending 
children to schools. Although, in many poor societies the opportunity cost of sending children 
to school is greater than the benefits of educating them, however, recent evidence on education 
status in South Asia confirm the slackness of parents towards sending children to school due 
to school quality or teachers absence rather than economic reasons(Banerjee & Duflo, 2006; 
Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). At higher grade level such as grade 9th and 10th, teachers’ absence 
from schools might affect parent’s response. For example the potential financial incentives for 
teachers when they (deliberately) avoid teaching at schools in order to increase the chances of 
private tutoring, might pose a financial challenge for parents (Glewwe & Kremer, 2006). The 
third source of monitoring effect on children performance might be the link between teacher’s 
attendance and children attendance. We check the program impact on children attendance 
measured as number of present children on the date of survey to the total enrollment in the 
school. Results shown in Appendix II suggest a slight increase (1.7% with 10 % significance 
level) in children attendance in year 2015, however, the magnitude is small indicating a subtle 
effect on the children attendance. The program effect on children attendance is not significant 
when we add 2016 as a post-program year. In either of our specifications, children attendance 
appears to be less affected (or unaffected) during the year immediately after the program. This 
is surprising as a number of studies document a strong association of teachers attendance with 
school participation and hence children academic performance. However, Glewwe & Kremer 
(2006) differentiate school participation from children attendance and argue that increasing 
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teachers attendance and school quality might increase participation which means giving more 
time to school related tasks rather than mere attendance. Finally, governance reforms such as 
monitoring that target school quality appear to hold more promise than simply providing 
monetary incentives to teachers based on test scores. For example, threat of a top-down audit 
significantly reduces corruption (Olken, 2004) and teachers at schools that were inspected more 
often resulted in reduced absence (Chaudhury et al., 2005b). However, there are limited 
evidence that externally controlled monitoring when coupled with clear and credible threat of 
punishment induces “good” teaching behavior at school.
We turn to our second outcome of interest, children test performance to see the direct effect of 
the monitoring program on the test performed by enrolled children at home. We follow Glewwe 
& Kremer (2006) to obtain the reduced form relationship using model (8) [equation (6)] in 
estimating normalized test performance in three different subjects e.g Reading, Mathematics 
and English. With regard to the level of difficulty, the ASER test questions8 for each subject 
are designed to measure the very basic Learning, English and Math ability in view of achieving 
SDG indicator 4.2.1(ASER, 2016). According to ASER reports, the survey is pitched to grades 
2 and 3 competencies only, corresponding with the SDG indicators for tracking learning at the 
lower primary level. The survey procedure in ASER annual publications also confirms the low 
difficulty levels of tests. In addition to that, ASER data survey also include three additional
questions(called bonus questions) for reading, two bonus questions related to math and one 
additional question related to english. Although, these additional questions might still be easier, 
we attempt to utilize them to construct normalized test variable for upper grade children (See 
Appendix X for details on the procedure of ASER test questionnaire). In their paper on ASER-
(Pratham), India, Banerji et al., (2013) describe that children of grade 3 onwards have no 
difficulties in completing all questions asked by ASER survey. Nevertheless, in view of the 
extremely discouraging learning status reported by different organizations in Pakistan over the 
last few years, we rely on the ASER’s basic test questionnaires (five questions each subject) 
for lower grade children to gauge the ability level of enrolled children. We aggregate the 
individual dummies for each of five questions in each subject to construct a raw score for each 
surveyed child and subsequently normalize9 by year, district and individual grades to obtain a 
reliable measure of test score. A similar procedure was adopted for ASER bonus questions to 
create normalized test score for children enrolled in higher grade children (see Appendix VI 
and VII) for upper grade children and including year 2014 as pre-treatment. 
Table 4(b) reports the direct program effect on the normalized test score for lower grade (0 to 
5) enrolled children using 2012 and 2013 as Pre-Program. For simplicity purpose, we only 
report coefficients of the interaction term of KP and Post to show the differential effect of the 
treatment after the program. Previous literature on learning outcomes documents effects of
factors such as individual characteristics, parent’s education and household characteristics on 
the learning performance of children(Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2018; Azam et al., 2016; Banerjee 
                                                            
8 The ASER HH survey contains five basic questions ranging from low difficulty to higher difficulty. For example, 
for reading five test dummies are whether the surveyed child is at Beginners level, can read letters, can read words  
can read sentences, can read story. Similar procedure is adopted for mathematics and English questions. 
9 After constructing the raw score, we standardize the score as:  z=
(   )̅
 
  where,   a̅nd   are the mean and 
standard deviation of the test score by each individual grade. 
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et al., 2007; Croke, 2014; Jackson, 2009; Raikes, 2016). We therefore control for individual 
child-specific characteristics, parents education and household characteristics along with 
district fixed effect and year fixed effect. The first three columns report the program effect on 
the Reading, Maths and English test scores normalized by year, district and individual grade 
for year 2015 as post-program. The last three columns report the two years (2015 & 2016) 
program effect on normalized test score of lower grade children. We observe a significantly 
positive effect of the IMU program on the enrolled children performance in maths and English 
while positive (but not significant) effect in reading. Conditional on child-specific controls, 
parent’s education and household characteristics, on average, being in the KP province 
increases a child’s normalized test performance by 0.07 stand deviations (SD) points in 
Reading, 0.13 SD points in Maths and 0.11 SD points in English. Adding 2016 s post-program 
year into analysis shows that there is not significant direct effect on IMU on children test 
performance. We also check the direct effect of the program on higher grade (6 to 10) children. 
The results are reported in Appendix table A4 (b). Since, data on the higher grade related 
questions was not available in year 2012, therefore, we report the results of higher grade 
children in table A4 (b) which include 2014 as pre-program period.  Though significant at 10% 
level, the program effect is positive for higher grade children in Reading bonus question and 
English bonus questions. This decreasing effect of program on higher grade children is 
consistent with earlier findings by Banerji et al., (2013) on the difficulty level of the ASER-
India test questions. In estimating results for table 4(b) and table A4 (b), we only include 
children that are currently enrolled in government schools and for whom information on 
covariates were available.
After adding 2016 as post-program year, the direct program effect on lower grade children 
normalized test score is positive, but not significant indicating a decrease in the program effect 
during the year 2016. Nevertheless, for higher grade children (as we show in A4 (b), the 
program effect persisted, though slightly reduced. Controlling for child-specific factors, 
parents and household characteristics, and the district and year fixed effects, the IMU increases 
the ability of higher grade children to answer bonus-test questions by 0.127 SD points for 
Reading, 0.136 for English at 5% significance level. This decrease in effect of children test 
performance coincides with the decrease in teachers’ attendance in 2016 as reflected in Table 
4(a) giving more weight to the possibility of direct effect of the monitoring program on children 
test performance. One way of linking the decreasing effect on children performance might be 
the reducing efforts of teachers even though they are present in the schools. Previous evidence 
also does not rule out this possibility. In estimating the effect of teacher’s incentive program in 
Kenya, Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer (2003) find a short run increase in learning score and argue 
that gains in learning were only temporary and were not accompanied by increases in teaching 
efforts. 
Our results on the children test score provide evidence in support of the idea that absence of 
teachers at lower grades schools causes low learning achievements in developing countries. 
Thus addressing teacher’s absence at lower level could be a key policy direction that can 
positively affect learning achievements of lower grade children. Such a policy direction might
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combine external control monitoring tools such as IMU with appropriate incentives 
mechanisms to maintain the quality of schools on sustainable basis.  With regard to higher 
grade children, besides increased oversight, teacher’s education or training quality may be 
coupled with efforts of increasing their attendance to ensure learning achievements. 
7.3.Enrollment Status 
Enrollment has been widely used as a key indicator for achieving sustainable development 
goals particularly children of age 5 to 16 in developing countries. A large number of out-of-
school children in rural areas of Pakistan has been a persisting issue that requires effective 
solution. According to recent reports, Pakistan continue to suffer for low enrollment and high 
dropout rate at primary and middle level schooling(Gouleta, 2015). A review by the
International growth Centre (ICG), in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa(KP) province in 2012-13 shows
only 63% of 4-9 years old children were enrolled in schools with a much lower (56%) female 
enrollment(CDPR, 2014). For higher grade, the net enrollment is even worst. For example, for 
middle schools, the net enrollment was hardly 40% reflecting a significant dropout or no-
enrollment during the middle school age group (11 to 15 years).
To investigate the overall effect of the monitoring program on the enrollment status of children 
surveyed at home, we analyze ASER household survey data from 2012 to 2016. The ASER 
household survey include a variable on the status of children of age 5 to 16 asking whether they 
are enrolled in schools or not. We drop all those children enrolled in private school, madrassas 
or any other school to obtain reduced sample of children either enrolled in government schools 
or not enrolled. We attempt our diff-in-diff model for post-program year as 2015 only and 2015 
and 2016 together to see the two years post program effect. Results reported in table 4(d) are 
suggestive of the positive direct effect of monitoring program on gross government school 
enrollment. Since enrollment status is a binary variable, in addition to simple OLS, we also 
compare Probit model while controlling for all household and child related characteristic. The 
OLS estimates show that conditional on household characteristics, compared to FATA, the 
probability of a schooling age child to be enrolled in government school increases in the KP 
province by 3.1% in 2015 while this effect is not significant in 2016.  The Probit marginal 
effects imply that children in KP province have a 4% higher probability of getting enrolled in 
government schools compared to FATA. Both OLS and probit results points to the similar drop 
in the gross enrollment of children in 2016 consistent with a similar trend in the children’s test 
outcomes and teachers attendance. However this effect should be interpreted carefully due to 
two reasons. First, children enrollment mainly depends on school density. In other words, if 
the government schools (e.g per village) increases, it might increase the gross enrollment per 
village. Secondly, each year, there might be a linear trend in population growth coupled with 
increasing awareness campaigns by government and non-government organizations. While we 
are applying year and district fixed effect which controls for any district and year specific 
characteristics, we believe this effect may come through parents whose behavior might be 
affected by the government’s monitoring programs. Earlier studies also support the idea that 
parents positively respond to increasing school quality in terms of enrolling their children in 
schools(Berman et al., 2013; Glewwe & Kremer, 2006; Jones et al., 2014). Although these 
effects seems small, considering the status of out-of-school children in developing countries 
particularly Pakistan, the implication of these results is worth noticing. If a government policy 
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targeted at one aspect of schooling such as teachers’ attendance, affect the children enrollment 
and test performance simultaneously besides increasing school quality, then the cost of such 
policies should be evaluated in terms all three outcomes of education; school quality, learning 
outcomes and enrollment. 
Table-4(d): Program Effect on Children Enrollment Status 
Dep. Var: Enrollment Status[0,1] Post=2015 Post=2016 & 2016
OLS Probit OLS Probit
Monitoring(treatment*Post) 0.0317** 0.040* 0.00105 0.004
(0.0152) (0.017) (0.0133) (0.015)
Child Age 0.0352*** 0.039** 0.0363*** 0.040**
(0.000610) (0.001) (0.000547) (0.001)
Gender(Female=1) -0.196*** -0.217** -0.191*** -0.212**
(0.00494) (0.005) (0.00427) (0.005)
Mother Highest Education -0.00161*** -0.002** -0.00189*** -0.002**
(0.000555) (0.001) (0.000501) (0.001)
Father Highest Education 0.00553*** 0.007** 0.00587*** 0.007**
(0.000414) (0.000) (0.000366) (0.000)
House-ownership 0.0134* 0.016 0.00772 0.010
(0.00805) (0.009) (0.00735) (0.008)
HH- Size -0.00161*** -0.002** -0.00175*** -0.002
(0.000498) (0.001) (0.000487) (0.001)**
Urban Districts 0.0751** 0.095* 0.0655* 0.083
(0.0355) (0.044) (0.0352) (0.044)
HH-Facilities Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.506*** 0.517***
(0.0212) (0.0179)
Observations 144,988 144,988 188,579 188,579
R-squared 0.195 0.190
Notes: Table 4 (d) reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff OLS coefficients and Probit marginal 
effects on the enrollment status of surveyed children. The first two columns reports results on the 2015 as post-
program only while the last two columns reports post-program period as 2015 & 2016. The pre-program period 
in all columns is 2012 to 2014 pooled. The dependent variable is a binary which child is enrolled in government 
school and zero otherwise. The sample does not include children that are enrolled in private or other schools. 
Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province (KP) and Post-program period. District and year fixed 
effect are applied throughout regression while controls for household facilities are also included. The data is 
from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The 
unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively
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7.4. Robustness Checks
Table -5 : Program Effect on Only Primary Schools[ grade0 to 5 ]
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance (1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0657*** 0.0567*** 0.0243 0.0141
(0.0182) (0.0209) (0.0165) (0.0194)
School Teaching Quality 0.0384** 0.0396** 0.0298** 0.0316**
(0.0162) (0.0194) (0.0140) (0.0160)
School Training Quality 0.0243 0.00995 0.0263* 0.0175
(0.0165) (0.0208) (0.0147) (0.0172)
urban -0.0164 -0.0244 -0.0521 -0.0255
(0.0379) (0.0640) (0.0440) (0.0393)
old-school -0.00946 0.000805 -0.0104 -0.00386
(0.00986) (0.0115) (0.00936) (0.0107)
School Size(enrollment) 0.199*** 0.159** 0.145*** 0.105
(0.0550) (0.0693) (0.0549) (0.0683)
Schools Facilities Controls YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.785*** 0.764*** 0.827*** 0.819***
(0.0355) (0.0405) (0.0307) (0.0342)
Observations 2,765 2,087 3,429 2,751
R-squared 0.082 0.090 0.066 0.065
Mean of the dep. Var: 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887
Notes: Table-5 shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance in 
government run primary schools only. Column (1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-
2014 & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 
while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13 (2) respectively.  The outcome variable is the ratio of 
teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. Variable Monitoring is a typical diff-
in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year). Due to District and year 
fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for treatment and posts. 
Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous variables 
showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total 
appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include availability of water, 
boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a 
continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school 
with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School 
Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of 
observation is the surveyed government primary school where children from grade0 to 5 are 
taught. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.    
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Table -6 : Program Effect on Reduced Sample of Bordering Districts
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance (1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0800*** 0.0779*** -0.00384 -0.000501
(0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0220) (0.0230)
School Teaching Quality 0.0462** 0.0313 0.0356** 0.0257
(0.0218) (0.0255) (0.0178) (0.0199)
School Training Quality 0.0127 0.000746 0.0123 0.00587
(0.0252) (0.0322) (0.0217) (0.0255)
urban -0.0478 0.0393 -0.0905** -0.0637
(0.0481) (0.0456) (0.0454) (0.0497)
old-school -0.00143 0.00716 -0.00723 -0.00390
(0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0122) (0.0140)
School Size(enrollment) 0.127** 0.0733 0.138** 0.100
(0.0556) (0.0634) (0.0542) (0.0627)
Schools Facilities Controls YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.759*** 0.738*** 0.789*** 0.775***
(0.0385) (0.0427) (0.0348) (0.0378)
Observations 1,515 1,123 1,845 1,453
R-squared 0.056 0.070 0.050 0.056
Mean of the dep. Var: 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.871
Notes: Table-6 shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance in 
government run schools using the reduced sample of districts bordering with FATA and FATA. 
Column (1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014 & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. 
Similarly Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13 (2) 
respectively.  The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed 
teachers. Variable Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for 
corresponding year). Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not 
include variables for treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training 
Quality are continuous variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific 
training level to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include 
availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. 
School Size is a continuous variable representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school 
to the school with highest number of enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan 
School Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of 
observation is the surveyed government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.    
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8. CONCLUSION 
Initiatives to reduce teachers’ absenteeism in public schools range from offering incentives to 
instituting school committees to decentralizing of education to local government to externally 
controlled monitoring etc., however, to what extent such initiatives persist their effect and how 
much they affect children learning performance is rarely understood.  In this paper, we examine 
the effect of a large scale public schools monitoring program featured by the use of smart-
phone aided facility through professionally trained monitors in the KP province, Pakistan. We 
use five years data from a country wide annual representative survey to compare treated region 
with a neighboring untreated region that share similar characteristics in all aspects except the 
program. Our data consists a rich set of variables that allow estimation of education production 
function in the context of a purely exogenous intervention. Our findings suggest that 
monitoring of government schools through trained monitors equipped with smart-phone-aided 
biometric facility improved teacher’s attendance by nearly 8% in the year immediately 
following the program. However, this effect decreases by nearly half after two years of the 
program introduction. 
We also find the program’s direct effect on the enrolled children’s test performance at home. 
Enrolled children’s standardized Reading, Math and English ability in the monitored schools 
has improved significantly by 0.07, 0.13 and 0.11 standard deviations points respectively at the 
lower (0-5) grades. There is slight improvement in the standardized test performance of higher 
grade children. We also find a positive immediate effect of the program on the likelihood of 
school-aged children enrollment into government schools suggesting responsiveness of parents 
towards a large scale program.  
Our results on the children performance provide evidence in support of the idea that absence 
of teachers at lower grades schools causes low learning achievements in developing countries. 
Thus addressing teacher’s absence at lower level could be a key policy direction that can 
positively affect learning achievements of lower grade children. Such a policy direction might 
be combined with external control monitoring tools such as IMU with appropriate incentives 
mechanisms to maintain the quality of schools on sustainable basis. With regard to higher grade 
children, besides increased oversight, teacher’s education or training quality may be coupled 
with efforts for increasing their attendance to ensure learning achievements.  
Two broad implications can be derived from our results. First, incorporation of advanced 
technology in schools monitoring has a stronger effect on the teachers and children 
performance simultaneously. Such initiatives might have wide rage effects than the targeted 
outcomes. Secondly, how long such effects sustain, depends on complementary measures that 
links teachers performance with children performance.
9. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Despite having a clear identification strategy, our work is subject to certain limitations. First, 
we use survey data that is collected on annual basis, and only capture the yearly inspections of 
schools. Using monthly data on teacher’s attendance might be more useful in evaluating any 
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differential effect between KP and FATA schools performance.  Secondly, we couldn’t access 
more detailed administrative data on the characteristics of monitors employed by IMU for more
in-depth analysis of the program. Data collected by IMU staff on teacher’s attendance and 
school performance might be useful for comparison of ASER data and IMU data. Thirdly, the 
test questions for higher-grade children might weakly represent their performance because of 
low standard of the questions designed by ASER. ASER’s test questions mainly target low 
grade children as shown in Appendix X. Although we utilize the bonus questions to create 
normalize test score for higher grade children, a more standardized design of test taken at home 
for higher grade children would be more useful in gauging children performance. Finally, 
establishing a systematic channel between teacher’s attendance and children performance is 
important despite our findings that monitoring program has directly affected children test score. 
Given the differential effect in 2015, future research might utilize two stage least square (2SLS) 
approach to for establishing a clear link between teacher’s attendance and children test score. 
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Appendix I
Table –A1: Falsification Test on Private School Data 
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance Ratio Post=2015(a) Post=2015(b) Post(a) Post(b)
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.000348 -0.0196 -0.0244 -0.0473
(0.0335) (0.0375) (0.0257) (0.0298)
School Teaching Quality 0.0348* 0.0239 0.0364* 0.0292
(0.0190) (0.0225) (0.0198) (0.0234)
School Training Quality -0.00510 0.00115 -0.00739 -0.00506
(0.0244) (0.0322) (0.0239) (0.0304)
urban 0.0166 0.0408 0.00401 -0.0332
(0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0276) (0.0407)
old schools -0.0232 -0.0260 -0.0262 -0.0276
(0.0198) (0.0220) (0.0193) (0.0214)
enrollment 0.0768* 0.0530 0.0874** 0.0718
(0.0402) (0.0507) (0.0395) (0.0488)
Schools Facilities Controls YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.511*** 0.576*** 0.776*** 0.545***
(0.0267) (0.189) (0.0346) (0.0297)
Observations 1,674 1,292 1,944 1,562
R-squared 0.064 0.100 0.057 0.081
Notes: Table-A1 reports the falsification test of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance using 
private school data.  We run the same specification of our main effect on the private school data to 
see any systematic trend in the teacher’s attendance of private school data. Column (1) & (2) represent 
Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014(1) & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly column (3) & (4) 
represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13(2) respectively.  The outcome 
variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. Variable Monitoring 
is an interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year).  Due to District and year fixed 
effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for treatment and posts. Variables 
School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous variables which show the ratio 
of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total appointed teachers in each 
school.  School Facilities controls include availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, 
laboratory, computer and internet. Enrollment is a continuous variable representing the ratio of 
children enrolled in surveyed school to the school with highest number of enrolled children.  The 
data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are 
shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed private school. Statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.    
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Appendix II
Appendix Table –A2: Program Impact on Children Attendance in Government Schools 
Dep. Var: Children Attendance Ratio Post=2015(a) Post1=2015(b) Post(a) Post(b)
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0177* -0.00579 0.00873 -0.0168
(0.00973) (0.0116) (0.0103) (0.0121)
School Teaching Quality 0.0104 0.0166* -0.000394 0.00357
(0.00817) (0.00959) (0.00800) (0.00912)
School Training Quality -0.00269 0.00140 0.00139 0.00773
(0.00952) (0.0112) (0.00897) (0.0103)
urban 0.00428 -0.0510* -0.0215 -0.0434
(0.0258) (0.0293) (0.0229) (0.0276)
Old schools -0.00862 -0.00905 -0.00790 -0.00865
(0.00534) (0.00620) (0.00528) (0.00606)
Schools Facilities Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.802*** 0.800*** 0.792*** 0.790***
(0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0170) (0.0190)
Observations 4,053 3,019 4,953 3,919
R-squared 0.095 0.125 0.092 0.112
Notes: Table-A2 shows main effect of the monitoring program on children attendance. Column (1) & (2) 
represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014(1) & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly column (3) & 
(4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13(2) respectively.  The outcome 
variable is the ratio of children present in school to the total enrollment. Variable Monitoring is an 
interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year).  Due to District and year fixed effect 
applied in each regression, we do not include variables for treatment and posts. Variables School 
Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous variables which show the ratio of teachers 
with master’s degree and specific training level to the total appointed teachers in each school.  School 
Facilities controls include availability of water, boundary, toilet, library, playground, laboratory, 
computer and internet. The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed government 
school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.    
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Appendix III
Table A3 (b): Pre-Program Difference, Normalized Test Score [Equation (8)]
Normalized Test Score
Lower Grades-(0-to -5) Upper Grade (6 -10)
Reading Math English Reading Math English
Pre-Program Difference (KP*Post) -0.150** -0.0112 -0.0657 0.0218 0.0783 -0.334***
(0.0633) (0.0571) (0.0601) (0.0622) (0.0590) (0.0917)
Child -Related Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Dummies Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.443*** -0.00221 -0.0470 1.211*** 0.685*** 0.257
(0.0927) (0.0846) (0.0906) (0.134) (0.161) (0.186)
Observations 38,923 38,818 38,762 11,054 11,054 10,942
R-squared 0.068 0.062 0.069 0.115 0.111 0.116
Notes: Table 3(b) reports the pre-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2014 vs Pre=2012 &
2013 using the ASER Household Survey data.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is 
surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three columns) and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). 
The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. The pre-program difference is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of to-be-treated 
province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2014 and 0 if year=2012 or 2013). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District and year applied 
in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parent’s education controls include, mother and father highest education in 
years; household characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability of electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.    
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Appendix IV
Table -A4 (a) : Teachers Attendance Ratio[Equation(7)]
Dep. Var: Teachers Attendance (1) (2) (3) (4)
Monitoring (Treatment*Post) 0.0756*** 0.0665*** 0.0344** 0.0256
(0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0140) (0.0162)
School Teaching Quality 0.0344*** 0.0375** 0.0278** 0.0301**
(0.0125) (0.0150) (0.0111) (0.0127)
School Training Quality 0.0129 -0.00375 0.0167 0.00607
(0.0143) (0.0182) (0.0125) (0.0147)
urban -0.0303 0.0620 0.00645 0.0159
(0.0469) (0.0408) (0.0310) (0.0346)
old-school -0.00379 0.000548 -0.00650 -0.00469
(0.00785) (0.00919) (0.00751) (0.00863)
School Size(enrollment) 0.0945*** 0.0460 0.0789** 0.0368
(0.0357) (0.0448) (0.0351) (0.0433)
Schools Facilities Controls YES YES YES YES
District FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.884*** 0.880*** 0.846*** 0.839***
(0.0295) (0.0302) (0.0344) (0.0350)
Observations 4,053 3,019 4,953 3,919
R-squared 0.066 0.075 0.054 0.055
Mean of the dep. Var: .883 .886 .881 .883
Notes: Table-4(a) shows the main effect of the monitoring program on teacher’s attendance. Column 
(1) & (2) represent Post=2015 while Pre=2012-2014 & Pre=2012-2013 respectively. Similarly 
Column (3) & (4) represent Post=2015-2016 while Pre=2012-14(1) & Pre=2012-13 (2) respectively.  
The outcome variable is the ratio of teachers present in school to the total appointed teachers. Variable 
Monitoring is a typical diff-in-diff interaction of treatment (KP) and Post (for corresponding year). 
Due to District and year fixed effect applied in each regression, we do not include variables for 
treatment and posts. Variables School Teaching Quality and School Training Quality are continuous 
variables showing the ratio of teachers with master’s degree and specific training level to the total 
appointed teachers in each school.  School Facilities dummies include availability of water, boundary, 
toilet, library, playground, laboratory, computer and internet. School Size is a continuous variable 
representing the ratio of children enrolled in surveyed school to the school with highest number of 
enrolled children.  The data is taken from the ASER-Pakistan School Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is the surveyed 
government school. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.    
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Appendix V
Table A4 (b): Program Effect, Normalized Test Score [Equation (8)]
Normalized Test Score 
Lower Grades-(0-to -5) Upper Grade (6 -10)
Reading Math English Reading Math English
Monitoring (KP*Post) 0.130** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.100* 0.0307 0.121*
(0.0524) (0.0478) (0.0508) (0.0594) (0.0561) (0.0707)
Child -Related Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.431*** -0.0736 -0.0709 1.439*** 1.017*** 0.710***
-0.0779 -0.0703 -0.0751 (-0.124) (-0.13) (-0.149)
Observations 60,308 60,082 60,076 17156 17156 17059
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.070 0.147 0.160 0.143
Notes: Table 4(b) reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2015 vs 
Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. 
The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three columns) 
and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction 
of treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 and 0 if year=2012 or 2014). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District 
and year applied in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parents education controls include, mother and 
father highest education in years; household characteristics include ownership, house condition, and availability if electricity, mobile and 
television facilities. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  (See Appendix table A4 
(b) for complete regression results.)
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Appendix VI
Table A4 (c): Program Effect, Normalized Test Score [Equation (8)]
Normalized Test Score 
Lower Grades-(0-to -5) Upper Grade (6 -10)
Reading Math English Reading Math English
Monitoring (KP*Post) 0.0730 0.0221 0.0657 0.127** 0.0198 0.136**
(0.0474) (0.0440) (0.0461) (0.0506) (0.0490) (0.0618)
Child -Related Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parents Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Grade FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.355*** -0.0691 -0.0226 1.435*** 0.963*** 0.814***
-0.0724 -0.0672 -0.071 (0.107) (0.114) (0.129)
Observations 77724 77515 77509 21,744 21,744 21,373
R-squared 0.053 0.064 0.067 0.128 0.147 0.113
Notes: Table 4(b) reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for Post=2015 & 2016 
vs Pre=12-to-2014 (pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village level are shown in 
parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school from Grade-0 to grade-5(first three 
columns) and grade-6 to 10(last three columns). The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an 
interaction of treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 & 2016 and 0 if year=2012 or 2014). Fixed Effect on 
individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Child-related controls include age, private tuition; parents education controls 
include, mother and father highest education in years; household characteristics include ownership, size, house condition, and dummies for 
availability if electricity, mobile and television facilities. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.    
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Appendix VII
Program Effect on Children Test Performance 
Table-A4(b): Normalized Test Score  [Post=2015 vs Pre==2012-14 ] 
Grade-0 to Grade-5 Grade-5 to Grade-10
Reading Math English Reading Math English
DiD(treatment*Post) 0.130** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.100* 0.0307 0.121*
(0.0524) (0.0478) (0.0508) (0.0594) (0.0561) (0.0707)
Post(=2015, Pre=2012-14) 0.0310 -0.00182 0.00452 -0.246*** -0.119** -0.222***
(0.0478) (0.0418) (0.0450) (0.0496) (0.0494) (0.0630)
Treatment(KP) -0.169** -0.395*** -0.275*** -0.543*** -0.404*** -0.844***
(0.0850) (0.0787) (0.0819) (0.130) (0.117) (0.132)
Child Age 0.0847*** 0.0722*** 0.0674*** -0.00800 -0.0109 0.0157
(0.00814) (0.00749) (0.00737) (0.00828) (0.00854) (0.00969)
Mother Highest Education -0.00139 -0.00102 0.000449 -0.00220 0.000379 0.00317
(0.00238) (0.00214) (0.00229) (0.00296) (0.00258) (0.00311)
Father Highest Education 0.00103 0.00150 0.00161 0.00512*** 0.00410** -0.000725
(0.00157) (0.00155) (0.00158) (0.00177) (0.00176) (0.00221)
House-ownership 0.0737*** 0.0367 0.0219 0.0295 0.0228 0.0492
(0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0261) (0.0321) (0.0304) (0.0385)
Private Tutoring 0.196*** 0.154*** 0.160*** -0.00228 -0.0585 0.160***
(0.0407) (0.0380) (0.0426) (0.0428) (0.0451) (0.0435)
Electricity Availability 0.0136 -0.0412 -0.0542 -0.0325 0.0168 0.0892*
(0.0454) (0.0405) (0.0430) (0.0419) (0.0427) (0.0514)
Mobile service 
Availability 0.0848*** 0.0543** 0.0889*** 0.0975*** 0.0510 0.0840**
(0.0255) (0.0233) (0.0254) (0.0363) (0.0340) (0.0390)
TV availability 0.0241 0.0158 0.00277 -0.0299 -0.0432** 0.0207
(0.0191) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0240)
House condition 0.0375 0.0436 0.0497 0.0297 -0.0135 0.0581
(0.0331) (0.0320) (0.0321) (0.0412) (0.0381) (0.0456)
HH- Size -0.000153 0.00184 0.000509 9.57e-05 0.00170 0.00136
(0.00145) (0.00138) (0.00148) (0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00152)
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Grade FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.431*** -0.0736 -0.0709 1.439*** 1.017*** 0.710***
-0.0779 -0.0703 -0.0751 (-0.124) (-0.13) (-0.149)
Observations 60,308 60,082 60,076 17156 17156 17059
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.070 0.147 0.160 0.143
Notes: Table A4 (b) reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for 
Post=2015 vs Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors clustered at village 
level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in government school. 
The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of treated province
(KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 and 0 if year=2012 or 2014). Fixed Effect on individual grade, District 
and year applied in each regression. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively
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Appendix VIII
Program Effect on Children Test Performance 
Table-A4(3): Normalized Test Score  [Post=2015 & 16 vs Pre==2012-14 ] 
Grade-0 to Grade-5 Grade-5 to Grade-10
Reading Math English Reading Math English
DiD(treatment*Post) 0.0730 0.0221 0.0657 0.127** 0.0198 0.136**
(0.0474) (0.0440) (0.0461) (0.0506) (0.0490) (0.0618)
Post(=2015, Pre=2012-14) -0.108** -0.256*** -0.235*** -0.119** -0.0562 0.126**
(0.0477) (0.0424) (0.0450) (0.0488) (0.0488) (0.0596)
Treatment(KP) -0.0447 -0.263*** -0.115 -0.418*** -0.215** -0.591***
(0.0755) (0.0735) (0.0750) (0.101) (0.0923) (0.102)
Child Age 0.0802*** 0.0673*** 0.0623*** -0.00715 -0.0115 0.00688
(0.00685) (0.00660) (0.00618) (0.00719) (0.00742) (0.00825)
Mother Highest Education 0.00250 0.000588 0.00310 -0.00231 -0.00128 0.00413
(0.00216) (0.00210) (0.00215) (0.00252) (0.00232) (0.00269)
Father Highest Education 0.00378*** 0.00419*** 0.00340** 0.00410*** 0.00342** -0.00337*
(0.00140) (0.00145) (0.00142) (0.00154) (0.00154) (0.00191)
House-ownership 0.0468** 0.0381* 0.00586 0.0230 0.0454 0.0613*
(0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0243) (0.0281) (0.0301) (0.0331)
Private Tutoring 0.277*** 0.249*** 0.266*** 0.0151 -0.0589 0.112***
(0.0371) (0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0345) (0.0402) (0.0382)
Electricity Availability 0.0166 -0.00693 -0.0377 -0.0308 0.0510 0.0587
(0.0374) (0.0340) (0.0359) (0.0380) (0.0422) (0.0439)
Mobile service 
Availability 0.0333 0.00955 0.0560** 0.0712*** 0.0277 0.0395
(0.0217) (0.0204) (0.0222) (0.0272) (0.0261) (0.0301)
TV availability 0.0205 0.0180 0.0189 -0.0140 -0.0524*** 0.0408*
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0209)
house_condition 0.0282 0.0302 0.0302 0.0453 0.0550 0.0655*
(0.0299) (0.0304) (0.0299) (0.0361) (0.0348) (0.0391)
HH- Size -0.00129 0.00193 0.000142 -0.000398 5.15e-05 -0.000119
(0.00146) (0.00140) (0.00148)
District FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Grade FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.355*** -0.0691 -0.0226 1.435*** 0.963*** 0.814***
-0.0724 -0.0672 -0.071 (0.107) (0.114) (0.129)
Observations 77724 77515 77509 21,744 21,744 21,373
R-squared 0.053 0.064 0.067 0.128 0.147 0.113
Notes: Table A4 (c) reports the Post-program difference using diff-in-diff estimates on the children test performance for 
Post=2015 & 2016(pooled) vs Pre=12-to-2014(pooled). The data is from the ASER Household Survey.  Standard errors 
clustered at village level are shown in parentheses. The unit of observation is surveyed 3 to 16 year’s old child enrolled in
government school. The dependent variable is the test score normalized by grade. Variable Monitoring is an interaction of 
treated province (KP) and Post (which is equal to 1 if year==2015 or 2016 and 0 if year=2012 to 2014). Fixed Effect on 
individual grade, District and year applied in each regression. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10% levels are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively
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Appendix IX
List of Districts in Khyber Pakhtunkwha and FATA
Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas(FATA)
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Bordering 
FATA-Bannu Abbottabad No 
FATA-Lakki Marwat Bannu YES 
FATA-Peshawar Battagram No
FATA-Tank Buner No
Khyber Agency Charsadda YES
Mohmand Agency Chitral No
Orakzai Agency D.I.Khan YES
Bajaur Agency Hangu YES
FATA-Kohat Haripur No
Kurram Agency Karak YES
FATA-DIKhan Kohat YES
Kohistan No
Lakki Marwat YES
Lower Dir YES
Malakand YES
Mansehra No
Mardan YES
Mardan-Urban YES
Nowshera YES
Peshawar YES
Peshawar - Urban YES
Shangla No
Swabi No
Swat No
Swat-Urban No
Tank YES
Tor Ghar No
Upper Dir YES
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Appendix  X
ASER-Pakistan Children Test Procedure(Math Test)
Source: ASER Pakistan, 2016
